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I. INTRODUCTION
Happiness and its relationship to law is clearly the topic du jour
among those interested in interdisciplinary efforts. Discussions of the
topic are pervasive and range from standard self-help books' to serious
scholarship. 2 This is to be expected, because quite clearly, happiness*

Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor Law, University of Florida College of

Law.
1. See, e.g., Russ HARRIs & STEVEN HAYES, THE HAPPINESS TRAP: How To STOP
STRUGGLING AND START LIVING (2008); SONJA LYUBOMIRSKY, THE How OF HAPPINESS: A NEW
APPROACH To GETrING THE LIFE YOU WANT (2008).
2. See generally ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); BRINo S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS:
How THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING (2002); DANIEL GILBERT,
STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING
MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM (2006); JENNIFER MICHAEL HECHT, THE HAPPINESS MYTH:
WHY WHAT WE THINK IS RIGHT IS WRONG (2007); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS
FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005); MATTHIEU RICARD, HAPPINESS: A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING LIFE'S
MOST IMPORTANT SKILL (Jesse Browner trans., Little, Brown & Co. 2006); Jeremy A.

Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155
(2005) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions]; Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining
Happiness, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sa. 11176 (2003) [hereinafter Easterlin, Explaining
Happiness]; Richard A. Easterlin, Income andHappiness: Toward a Unified Theory, 111 EcoN.
J. 465 (2001) [hereinafter Easterlin, Income and Happiness]; Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising
the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?, 27 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 35 (1995)
[hereinafter Easterlin, Happiness of All]; INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon
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or some version of well-being-is a dominant concern for most of us. 3
Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect law, broadly speaking, to
be designed to address this desire to achieve happiness.4
Part of the rationale for the interest in happiness is that it is a
potential substitute for conventional notions of efficiency. Every
conventional efficiency-oriented standard is based on expectations that
one will be better off. For example, demand is based on willingness to
pay but not on the outcome of the actual purchase. Happiness, on the
other hand, is about how things turn out. Indeed, the importance of a
topic is evident when two well-published and eminent law professors
present a book of readings on the topic. Law and Happiness, edited by
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, is such a book. It suggests that even the
most serious people regard the law and happiness relationship as
something to examine closely.
Law and Happiness-perhaps a play on Law and Economics-is
composed of twelve previously published articles, including a brief
introduction culled from the pages of the Journalof Legal Studies,6 in
particular those reproducing the works presented at a University of
Chicago conference on happiness and its implications for law and
public policy.7 A review of a book of readings can be approached in two
ways. First, one may review the individual contributions, each of which
may or may not have something valuable to say. In this case, they all
do. A second approach asks, what does this collection, viewed as a
snapshot of happiness research, tell us more generally about the state of
affairs in this new area of interdisciplinary study? This Review adopts
this second perspective. Although most of the individual contributions
are assessed, that exercise serves the end of bringing the overall picture
into focus. This is not to say that each contribution is not of high
quality.
Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology
of UtilityAppraisals, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 470 (Daniel

Kahneman et al. eds., 1999); Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point
Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in MaritalStatus, 84 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 527
(2003). For an excellent selection of readings, see WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC

PSYCHOLOGY, supra. The most comprehensive review of the literature is found in Peter Henry
Huang,Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. OF LAW & Soc. SCa. (Dec. 2010).
3. Throughout this Review, happiness will be equated with a sense of well-being or
subjective well-being. It is important not to confuse this with actual well-being. See Matthew
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in LAW AND HAPPINESS 257
(Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2010) [hereinafter HAPPINESS].
4. "Well-being" may not necessarily mean a sense of well-being.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 13-15.

6. Matthew Adler & Eric Posner, Happiness Research and Cost Benefit Analysis, 37 J.
LEG. STUD. S253 (2008).
7. The book represents an improvement for readers and researchers in that it includes a
relatively brief index.
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The collection is highly useful in this respect because its range is
broad. Some articles are highly quantitative and non-normative in
nature. Others are more philosophical, while still others describe the
implications of happiness for specific areas of law, including damages
for personal harm and crime. It should be noted that although the
authors refer to each other from time to time, the articles do not reveal
an in-depth exchange between the authors. In addition, the most obvious
impression one draws from the collection is that there are many issues
to be resolved before policy can be reliably designed to advance
happiness.
The initial section of this Review starts with an examination of why
it is difficult to discuss happiness and a discussion of the many issues
that arise when people discuss happiness. It also identifies the overall
themes found in Law and Happiness. Indeed, even the use of the word
"happiness" as a topic is terribly imprecise. What it means may vary
from reader to reader. Then, the Review assesses how this collection of
writings can assist in linking one notion of happiness or another with
actual policy. Ultimately, whether intentionally or not, the collection
reveals how far we are from a consensus on what should count in an
assessment of happiness, and how much enhancing happiness, however
defined, can be used in determining policy. Although the contributions
to Law and Happiness are a collection of the highest quality, like law
and happiness literature more generally, there is much work still left to
be done. Ultimately, we may find that a focus on happiness is no less
complex and imprecise than relying on standard notions of economic
efficiency. Fortunately, that question does not need to be answered at
this early stage.

II. THE COMPLEXITIES OF HAPPINESS
"I don't trust happiness. I never did, I never will."8
A. Why it is Seductive
The editors of Law and Happiness note the importance of happiness
studies to those dissatisfied with traditional notions of economic
efficiency.9 The idea of maximizing utility-one possible concept of
efficiency-leads to the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of

8. TENDER MERCIES (universal Pictures 1983) (spoken by Robert Duvall).
9. HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 1.
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utility and the numerous dangers of strict utilitarianism.' 0 Paretian
concepts of efficiency create a public policy straitjacket in the sense
that all but voluntary exchanges are likely to leave someone in a worse
situation. Finally, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency only requires that the gainers
from a resource reallocation be capable of compensating the losers.12
None of these guarantees that net happiness is increased.
Part of the problem is tied to the economic notion that we assess a
person's preferences by observing choices.13 The disconnect between
these measures of efficiency and happiness is obvious.14 Each measure
only considers choices when made, and not the outcome in terms of
happiness or well-being. To the extent economics focuses on utility, it is
actually ex ante utility. The simple fact is that preferences at one point
and the choices those preferences lead to do not necessarily produce
happiness in the future. In addition, for the most part, these notions of
efficiency view increases in utility as a product of change and
acquisition. That is, they concentrate on external stimuli as sources of
happiness but do not consider the possibility that one can
psychologically adapt to the status quo and become happy.16
Problems with various notions of efficiency lead to a desire to
consider outcomes-actual states of well-being. In fact, happiness may
be regarded as ex post happiness or utility. Moreover, an argument can
10. See generally J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMSON, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 17-27 (1973); R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 118-34 (1962).

11. The standard of Pareto Superiority is met when a change in resources results in at least
one person being better off and no one being worse off. See generally JEFFREY L. HARRISON &
JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 229-30 (2008). See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing

Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 2
(1997).
12. For a general discussion, see JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42-44

(2007); see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency and the Promise of Decisional Equity:
From Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 935, 942-94 [hereinafter DecisionalEquity].
13. This is known as "revealed preference" and seems to have originated with Paul
Samuelson. See P.A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5
ECONOMICA 61, 70-71 (1938). For a discussion, see Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Choice and
Revealed Preference, 21 So. EcoN. REv. 119 (1954).
14. In their own contribution to the collection, the editors write "[e]conomists traditionally
equate well-being with the satisfaction of actual preferences." HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 257.
This is somewhat misleading. Economists assume that the choices made in the market reveal
preferences. Economists typically do not measure whether actual satisfaction occurs.
15. Daniel Kahneman et al. capture this distinction, distinguishing "decision utility" from
"experienced utility." See Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of
Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. EcoN. 375 (1997) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Back to
Bentham?]. They describe the circularity of conventional economics like this: "In current
economics and in decision theory, the utility of outcomes and attributes refers to their weight in
decisions: utility is inferred from observed choices and is in turn used to explain these choices."
Id. at 375.
16. DecisionalEquity, supra note 12, at 951-57.
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be made that law should be about people as they actually are and not
simply about their often misguided choices. This seemingly logical leap,
however, is not so simple. Just as economists have struggled with what
efficiency means, those who speak and write about happiness encounter
a similar set of problems. Unless these problems can be resolved,
happiness studies may wind up with the same indeterminacy problems
that haunt economics analysis.
B. Why Not to Trust Happiness
The issues that arise with happiness can be viewed as belonging to
two groups that are not wholly independent. One group consists of
issues with which economic analysis has unsuccessfully contended.
Another encompasses those issues associated with happiness studies
alone. The questions happiness research shares with economics is
whether individuals are rational maximizers. In the case of economics,
it is whether people are rational maximizers of (ex ante) utility.1 7 If one
switches to happiness, the question can be restated as whether
individuals are rational maximizers of happiness or ex post utility. This
can be broken down into whether individuals seek to maximize
anything, including happiness, and whether they are rational. In
economics, the issue is finessed by assuming that people are rational
maximizers of utility. Studies in behavioral economics over the last
thirty years have gone a long way toward testing these assumptions.' 8
17. For convenience purposes, I will use the term ex ante happiness to describe how an
individual anticipates a decision will turn out. Ex post refers the subjective response to the
actual impact on happiness.
18. The number of articles in law alone that address the implications of behavioral
economics is vast and often repetitive. One of the earliest is Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism,
Altruism and Market Illusions, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 passim (1986) [hereinafter Egoism]. See
also Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts,92 MINN. L. REv. 749
(2008); Jeremy Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. I passim (2007);
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions, supra note 2, at 155; Grant M. Hayden & Stephen Ellis,
Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 55 KAN. L. REV. 629 passim (2007); Christine
Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653,
1656 (1998); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 passim (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051
passim (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making
in Legal Scholarship:A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1499-1514, 1516-27 (1998);
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Tradedfor
Behavioral Law and Economics'Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 passim (2002). Perhaps
the most important recent publication to generate significant discussions about how law can
account for behavioral economics is Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism is not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Ciii. L. REV. 1159 passim (2003). See also Matthew D.
Adler et al., Symposium, Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal
Implications, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 707-15 (2003); Douglas G. Baird et al., Symposium, Homo
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Can we be sure individuals strive to maximize happiness? There are
several reasons to doubt this. First, eople may make decisions and
choices based on what seems "right." It is not clear that this can be
equated with happiness. Personal happiness may be subordinate to
wanting to feel that one has done the right thing. This in itself may be a
source of happiness, but it requires making the assumption that people
do not make (as Amartya Sen states) "counterpreferential" choice[s].20
The other problem with the idea of striving to maximize happiness is
that it may not make much difference. One of the leading theories about
happiness is that people adjust, and whether good or bad things happen,
21
they eventually return to a "set-point[]" level of happiness.
The other issue comparable to that associated with the application of
economics to law is whether people are rational.2 2 In this context, the
rationality question is whether, even if they want to maximize
happiness, people make consistent choices that advance that end. For
the most part, when people make choices, they believe they will be
happier with the outcome of the choice made, than how they would be if
they failed to make that choice, or if they pursued an alternative choice.
It is impossible to know whether that belief is, in fact, correct because
people cannot live their lives and assess their happiness in an alternative
context. For example, the law student may be quite happy in law school
but cannot know if he or she would have been happier if he or she had
chosen to attend medical school. Suppose the government surveys
physicians and lawyers and finds that physicians say they are, on
average, a 7 on a 1-10 scale measuring happiness. Attorneys report they
are in the range of 5. Based on that, medical education is subsidized in
order to allow more people to become physicians in order to, hopefully,
help them become happier. As with economics, the making of a choice
does not ensure greater happiness and, even if the level of happiness
turns out to be higher, by no means is it maximized.
There are happiness issues that extend beyond the problems often
associated with the traditional behavioral assumptions of economics.
When people think in terms of being happier, people usually associate
Economics, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain PsychologicalCasefor Paternalism,97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1165 passim (2003); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian
Paternalism,93 AM. ECON. REv. 175, 175-79 (2003).
19. See Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 337 (1977).
20. Id. at 328.
21. Lucas et al., supra note 2, at 527; see Phillip Brickman & Donald T. Campbell,
Hedonic Relativism and Planningthe Good Society, in ADAPTION-LEVEL THEORY 287, 287, 289

(Mortimer H. Appley ed., 1971).
22. See Egoism, supra note 18, at 1315-16, 1318; see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 18, at
1107-13.
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such thought with a change-a bigger house, a nice car, a more pleasing
climate. One can rephrase this by saying that people are less happy than
they could be because they want something or are missing something.
What this means is that another path to greater happiness is, in a rough
application of Zen philosophy, to decrease the wanting. 23 Certainly a
decrease in longing for unmet desires can lead to less unhappiness and
lead to a sense of contentment. This may seem fanciful but probably
every reader can think of something he or she wanted very badly, did
not get, and eventually forgot about it. In fact, they may be relieved that
the state of affairs that they thought would make them happier never
materialized. 24
Perhaps more serious than various ways of achieving greater
happiness is the question of when one measures happiness. One
possibility, experience sampling, 2 5 measures happiness in real time.
That is, people are monitored from hour to hour or from day to day. The
problem is that the perception of happiness or unhappiness changes as
time passes. What was excruciatingly painful may, upon recall, not
seem that upsetting-perhaps it may even become the source of current
happiness for having survived. Or something that was pleasing at the
time-eating a huge meal-could result in a great deal of regret.
Perhaps the most intriguing example of the complexity of happiness
involves an experiment where subjects' hands were submerged into
very cold water for different periods of time.2 6 In the case of the longer
submersion, the temperature was raised slightly before the subjects
removed their hands. 7 When asked which experience they would be
more willing to redo, they tended to choose the longer emersion.28
Not surprisingly, another problem is that having more is not
necessarily linked to greater happiness. In fact, in the latter part of the
twentieth century, while there was sustained economic growth in the
United States, there appears to have been no change in the average level
of happiness. 29 Some of this is no doubt driven by the relationship of
happiness to relative wealth and the reference group an individual
employs. Thus, even a relatively wealthy person in absolute terms may
23. See DecisionalEquity, supra note 12, at 941, 950-53, 980.
24. Although no contribution discusses this possibility in depth, one essay does suggest an
alternative way to achieve happiness. In Hive Psychology, Happiness and Public Policy, 37 J.
LEGAL STUD. S133, S134-36, S140-41, S143-52 (2008); Jonathan Haidt et al. discuss the
importance of groups as sources of happiness. This includes the notion of "transcending the
self."Id. at S145.
25. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM.
EcoN. REv. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts].
26. Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham?, supra note 15, at 386.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 387.
29. Easterlin, Happiness ofAll, supra note 2, at 37-38.
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be quite unhappy if his or her aspirations are to be more like those who
are even wealthier. Similarly, it is well understood that those who are
relatively poor in absolute terms can be happy if their reference group is
composed of those in a similar situation. 30
Unsettling to many, and yet to be fully addressed, is the closeness of
happiness to utilitarianism. 31 Economists often rely on indifference
curves to discuss matters of welfare. Without going into the
technicalities, an indifference curve illustrates a certain level of utility
and all the combinations of goods that are consistent with an individual
achieving that level of happiness. Higher indifference curves mean
greater utility. Obviously, the exercise is based on utilitarian notions.
One can substitute the idea of happiness or subjective well-being into
the analysis and it appears to be the same and raise the same issues. This
leads inevitably to questions of how one makes interpersonal
comparisons of happiness, whether average or total happiness should be
the goal, and what are we to make of the person from whom harming
others is a source of happiness. Most would probably agree, in fact, that
there is "good" and "bad" happiness.3 2 In fact, we know that happiness
alone cannot be the sole aim of public policy if for no other reason that
some sources of happiness would be morally unacceptable. 3 3 Invoking a
Paretian notion of happiness (a policy that at least one person must be
happier and none less happy) or a Kaldor-Hicks notion (those made
happier must be able to compensate those made less happy) simply
returns to a standard economic analysis with the emphasis on ex post
outcomes as opposed to ex ante choices.
Those writing about happiness have left unresolved another problem
with utilitarianism: is everything-good or bad-reducible to a
common denominator of utility? For example, is it only the amount of
utility that distinguishes eating a chocolate bar from watching a
beautiful sunset or are there different types of utility?34 In the case of
30. See generally 1 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT
DURING ARMY LIFE (1949). See also generally J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in
2 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 267, 269 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965); Paul D.
Sweeney et al., Using Relative Deprivation Theory to Explain Satisfaction with Income and Pay
Level: A Multi-study Examination, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 423 (1990).
31. There is some irony in this in that those proposing happiness as a substitute for
traditional economic analysis may be proposing a standard that is viewed as objectionable in the
context of economics.
32. In the context of this collection of readings, this theme is discussed in particular in
Martha Nussbaum, Who is the Happy Warrior: Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology, in
HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 81, 96-99.

33. See Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, supra note 25, at 42933.
34. See Nussbaum, Who is the Happy Warrior: Philosophy Poses Questions to
Psychology, in HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 85 (discussing John Stuart Mill). John Stuart Mill's
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happiness, is it all reducible to one scale of happiness, or are there
different types of happiness? This question actually does come into the
traditional economic analysis of law. The basic idea is that some
sources deliver different types of pleasure or utility than others. For
example, eating a hot fudge sundae may not be the source of the same
happiness sensation as watching one's son or daughter being born. At
the extreme, some sources of happiness may have lexical priority over
others. For example, no amount of material possession may equal the
happiness one feels from knowing that he or she is productive or
healthy.
Closely related is the question of whether happiness is all that
matters.35 The question was raised perhaps most provocatively by
Robert Nozick when he asked whether one would be willing to enter an
experience machine that would create a sense of consciousness, giving
the person in the machine a feeling that all was well, regardless of
whether all was in fact well.3 6 If one believes that the experience
machine would be unattractive, the implication is that something
matters other than happiness. This possibility is especially important in
light of set-point happiness theory. 37 Under that theory, people who
experience events that lead to great happiness or unhappiness return to
what might be called an equilibrium level of happiness. In other words,
they undergo a hedonic adaptation. If one accepts this theory, awards
based on suffering may overcompensate. On the other hand, studies that
purportedly support the set-point theory may be flawed, and even if they
are not, it is possible that happiness is not the only thing that counts.
Another problem with substantial policy implications is whether
happiness is based on relative or absolute measures. As it turns out,
there are forms of consumption that fall into one or the other, or both
categories. The problem with consumption based on comparisons is that
one may initially experience a sense of well-being as a result of
surpassing the Joneses, but there will always be new Joneses available
for comparison. 3 8 Perhaps more troublesome is the phenomenon of
views on this are discussed in his book. JOHN STUART MILLS, UTILITARIANISM 8-9 (George Sher

ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 2001) (1861).
35. One argument that happiness is all that matters it is can be found at RICHARD LAYARD,
HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 111-25 (2005). For proposals suggesting more than

subjective well-being matters, see Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts,
supra note 25, at 429; Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Selgiman, Beyond Money: Toward an Economy
of Well-Being, 5 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. INTHE PUB. INT. 1.1 (2004).
36. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA 42-44 (1974). Those familiar with the

film the Matrix will recognize the same dilemma. See generally THE MATRIX (Warner Bros.
Pictures 1999).
37. See supra text accompanying note 20.
38. See generally Easterlin, Happiness of All, supra note 2; Easterlin, Explaining
Happiness,supra note 2; Easterlin, Income and Happiness, supra note 2.
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relative deprivation. That is, people make comparisons and feel happy
or less happy based on a preselected reference group. Thus, a poorly
paid person with limited living conditions and inadequate medical care
may feel relatively happy if he compares himself to those who are
similarly situated. At the same time, an upper middle class person may
be unhappy because his or her house does not have a swimming pool.
Yet, it hardly seems acceptable, at least as a normative matter, to
allocate funds to build swimming pools but not for improved medical
care.
Finally, what is to be made of the "ignorance is bliss" problem? A
subjective sense of well-being can be quite different from how one
actually is. 39 The obvious case is one in which a person feels perfectly
healthy but has a terminable disease. Should their happiness be
extinguished by accurate information? Or suppose a person is quite
happy with her salary when the issue comes up over lunch with friends.
What she does not know is that she is paid less than people who work
for the same employer with whom she has not compared salaries. A
great deal of happiness is actually the result of ignorance.
What all this suggests is that happiness as a policy standard may be
no less slippery than traditional economic analysis. The important
question is whether we know enough about happiness to justify
significant public investment in happiness. In some instances, there are
probably easy answers, but what the essays in Law and Happiness
suggest is that the area remains imprecise and undeveloped. What is
interesting is that this conclusion flows not from any one article in the
collection, but from viewing the collection as a snapshot of the current
state of both empirical and theoretical work addressing happiness.
Although likely not intentional, the tensions within the field of law and
happiness are revealed. For example, some writers are not fully satisfied
that the set-point theory of happiness is accurate. Or, even if it is
accurate, happiness may not be the only thing that counts. Others
evidently feel that is it settled enough to justify policy
recommendations. In addition, there appears to be no uniform
agreement on how to assess happiness in a manner that would support
specific public policies. Finally, the issue of what matters other than
happiness is an obvious subtheme of the collection. An undercurrent in
this debate is an effort to distinguish happiness-oriented goals from
utilitarianism. If more counts than simply happiness, this separation
could be made. As will be illustrated below, these efforts range from
39. This analysis can get a bit sticky. The editors, Professors Adler and Posner write, "an
individual's well-being may depend on her having a spouse who is actually faithful (not just one
she believes to be). . . ." HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 259. It is a bit like a proverbial tree falling
in the forest. Some information-like having a treatable disease-can make one less happy but
lead to greater happiness later. Other information may just result in less happiness.

2010]

BOOK REVIEW

423

arguments to add other interests to the happiness analysis to
redefinitions of happiness.

III. EMPIRICISM MEETS THEORY: A RELEVANT HAPPINESS
STANDARD AND SOME APPLICATIONS

A number of the selections in Law and Happiness have an empirical
basis. One of those, with broad implications, is by Professors Paul
Dolan and Tessa Peasgood.4 0 It takes on the difficult task of identifying
a measure of well-being that is relevant for policymaking. Indeed, the
obvious link between theory and public policy is the development of a
practical measure. According to the authors, there are three
requirements. The measure should be "conceptually appropriate," valid,
and "empirically useful."Al Validity requires that the measure actually
be correlated with well-being on a consistent basis. 42 To be empirically
useful, the measure must allow policymakers to assess how much wellbeing goes up and down, and by how much.43 Included in this
requirement is that the measure not be subject to various decision biases
resulting from framing and optimism effects."
The "conceptually appropriate" standard raises the issue of wellbeing associated with illegal activity or activities that result in
externalities. 45 Presumably, it would not be appropriate to promote
happiness when it means that some will derive pleasure from the
displeasure of others or from addictive activities. Thus, the authors
confine their analysis to what they call, "prudential" well-being. In
doing this, they distinguish "the good life" from a life that is good for
the individual. It is, in effect, an effort to note that there is some moral
dimension to considerations of happiness.
Thus, although the "conceptually appropriate" standard is certainly
appealing, it is also a good illustration of one of the knottiest problems
in the analysis of happiness. For example, directly harming someone as
a source of happiness is generally unacceptable. On the other hand, a
system of taxation that is part of an effort to redistribute income and
increase the happiness of some can reduce the happiness of others. In
fact, at the extreme, it can have a detrimental effect on the physical
40. Paul Dolan & Tessa Peasgood, Measuring Well-Being ForPublic Policy: Preferences
or Experiences, in HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 5.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at i1.
Id.
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well-being of those taxed. Precisely where the line is drawn for
"prudential" well-being is very difficult for people to agree upon.
Nevertheless, using these three criteria, the authors examine income
as a proxy for well-being 4 7 as well as various surveys that involve
asking respondents about their satisfaction. Those who doubt that an
assessment of well-being can vary with the measures used will be
interested to note that the authors compare five possible measures of
well-being including income, consumption, general health, general
questions about life satisfaction, and life satisfaction with a focus on
specific criteria. The authors not only demonstrate the difference across
measures, but also that the differences change depending on the subjects
studied.4 In effect, a single standard appears to be difficult to identify.
Given this difference, it is important to identify a possibly superior
measure. As one would expect, none of the measures come close to
fully meeting the three standards the authors set out. Just the difference
between income and how happy people say they are means that the
income measure may not be conceptually appropriate. Moreover,
factors like marriage, health, and employment are correlated with
happiness, but not necessary with income. More subjective measures are
also imperfect. A person may report feeling as though he or she is doing
well even though he or she is poorly educated and ill-housed. This
raises the issue the authors do not, or cannot, fully answer satisfactorily:
Which is more important, how well off one is, or how well off one
feels?
On the validity standard, the reviews are not quite as mixed. The
authors note that income is positively correlated with health, longevity,
and similar measures of well-being. On the other hand, the correlation
with life satisfaction is less dependable. Subjective measures are
possibly even less dependable. For example, feeling happy may be a
result of adjusting to unpleasant conditions or eating beans every day
until he or she has had steak and cr6me brfilbe. The empirical question
is largely one of practicality. Income is a means to an end of some
sources of well-being but not all. Thus, there is the problem of
accounting for non-market preference-satisfying benefits. On the other
hand, when it comes to subjective evaluations of happiness,
considerable data suggests that the evaluation remains stable despite
circumstances. 4 9 People adjust to both good and bad events and the
disposition to feel satisfied may be genetically determined.
Three other empirical efforts also demonstrate the difficulty of
47. The authors label this "preference satisfaction" based on the connection between
income and the ability to address preferences through the market. Id. at 14.
48. For example, those over seventy years of age as compared to younger respondents.
See id. at 20-21.
49. Id. at 17.
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making happiness into a relevant public policy standard. In "The Effect
of Crime on Life Satisfaction," Mark A. Cohen demonstrates that crime
statistics that are indicative of the likelihood that one will be a victim of
crime have little connection to a person's happiness.50 On the other
hand, actually being a victim of crime does have an impact. Two
implications are particularly noteworthy. This does not mean that efforts
to lower crime statistics are irrelevant. Certainly the lower they are, the
lower the likelihood that one will be the target of crime. Still, the
statistics themselves are evidently not of great comfort. Second, the
outcome may be a result of optimism, an "it will not happen to me bias"
attitude which, although a misperception, is itself a source of increased
happiness. 5 ' This raises the sticky issue of whether it should be a policy
goal to make people more realistic about crime even though the
outcome could be a lower sense of security and well-being. In short, if
unrealistic optimism is the source of happiness, should public policy be
designed to force people to confront reality? This is a more complex
question than it may appear. Reduced optimism today may mean less
unhappiness later when an unfortunate event occurs. Moreover, realism
may result in a "better life" if not a happier life. The possibility that
crime victims may adjust and return to prior levels of happiness simply
complicates matters further. 52
Another empirical offering that highlights the need for a happiness
standard and the necessity of distinguishing, if possible, happiness and
utilitarianism is "Happiness Inequality in the United States" by Betsy
Stevenson and Justin Wolfers. 53 The authors assess the distribution of
happiness in the United States over a period of time (in this case 19722006) much like one might measure income inequality. This is a
different question from whether overall happiness has increased during
a period of economic growth. The answer to that question, which ma
or may not be surprising, is that happiness has not increased.
50. Mark A. Cohen, The Effect of Crime on Life Satisfaction, in HAPPINESS, supra note 3,
at 1325.
51. See generally W. KIP VisCUSi ET AL., LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
wORKER RESPONSE TO HAZARD INFORMATION 93-96 (1987); Eric Van den Steen, Rational

Overoptimism (And Other Biases), 94 AM. EcoN. REv. 1141 (2004).
52. The question of whether actual crime victims eventually return to prior levels of
happiness was beyond the scope of Cohen's effort. Another focused application of the teachings
of happiness is found in David A. Weisbach's What Does Happiness Research Tell About
Taxation?, in HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 293. Professor Weisbach questions the relationship
between status and happiness and the usefulness of tax policy, at least based on what is now
known about happiness.
53. Betsy Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Happiness Inequality in the United States, in
HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 33.

54. Id. (citing Easterlin, Happiness of All, supra note 2, at 33); David Blanchflower &
Andrew Oswald, Well-Being Over Time in Great Britain and the US., 88 J. PUB. EcoN. 1359
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Stevenson and Wolfers report striking movements in the distribution of
happiness. Perhaps more important in light of the search for a measure
of happiness is how they assessed it. They asked a single question:
"Taken all together, how would you say things are these days-would
you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?" The
limitations of such a survey in terms of public policy implications are
obvious. Happiness can be a consequence of factors unrelated to
publicly undertaken measures. In addition, as already noted, there are
sources of happiness that test our sense of what is legitimate-alcohol,
drugs, and the mistreatment or exploitation of others.
A study about the distribution of happiness cannot help but lead to
the same questions that are troublesome in the context of utilitarianism.
What is the goal? Is it to increase total happiness or average happiness?
In the context of the distribution of happiness, if we are concerned about
total average happiness, the distribution of happiness may not matter.
For example, a society composed of people who are extremely happy
and people are who are extremely unhappy can have the same average
happiness as one composed of moderately happy people and moderately
unhappy people. It is likely that most people do feel that the distribution
of happiness is important; however, that is a normative question and
beyond the scope of most social sciences.
The normative question may be informed by some of the data
presented by the authors. What the authors report is that differences
based on race have declined and differences based on gender have
virtually disappeared. At least with respect to race, the narrowing could
be associated with a decrease in social injustices more generally. On the
other hand, the closing of the gender gap means the usual pattern of
women being happier than men has ended. This presents, again, the
question related to whether ignorance is bliss. Is it possible that greater
opportunities for women have led to increased ambition and more
frustration? Making the analysis even more complex is that inequalities
associated with different education levels have increased, student
happiness has generally declined, and income distribution has become
less equal. This may seem discouraging, but in fairness, at least it
suggests a path that is ultimately more promising than reliance on
income levels.
Together, these three sophisticated empirical efforts expose the
extreme practical difficulties of addressing happiness issues directly. In
particular, if the desire is to harness public policy to increase happiness,
just how is the success of those measures to be assessed? Perhaps more
difficult is a determination of whether the means that governments can
bring to bear can have a significant impact on happiness.
(2004).
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ALL THAT MATTERS?

Another theme that is found throughout Law and Happiness is a
question of whether happiness is all that matters. As noted in the
Introduction, there is possibly a micro and macro version of this
question. The micro version involves the issue of what should matter, if
anything, other than happiness. The macro version is more in line with
redefining happiness.
To understand the importance of the micro version, it is useful to
consider "Death, Happiness, and the Calculation of Compensatory
Damages" by Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee. 5 As the
title implies, the subject is one that has been debated for decades: Can
one put a value on emotional suffering? Rather than approaching the
issue from a "willingness to pay" perspective, 56 the authors present a
regression analysis in which a number of variables-income, job status,
educational level-are correlated with a life satisfaction measure. In
effect, the authors focus on bereavement and income as sources of
increases or decreases in life satisfaction. The implication is that, in the
aftermath of a death, a certain amount of compensation can return the
bereaved to the same level of life satisfaction. The authors present these
monetary values as a variation based on the relationship of the bereaved
to the deceased.
The authors do an admirable job of assessing the level of
bereavement and the factors that influence their intensity. There is no
doubt that the methodology is quite clever. Whether it really tells us
what the harm is to the bereaved is another question. The implication is
that the death of a child or spouse can be offset if compensation is
sufficient. Yet, in a context in which the potentially bereaved person is
asked to sell the well-being of a relative and his own happiness, it seems
unlikely that the numbers developed by the authors would have much
relevance. This follows from the possibility that not all sources of
happiness are of the same order. In short, there are no compensating
variables57 that offset certain kinds of losses.58 Ultimately, the
suggestion is that enough money to buy, let us say, a bigger house or an
55. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness and the Calculation
of CompensatoryDamages, in HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 217.
56. Very generally, this involves asking a person what it would take to compensate for the
death of a loved one.
57. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner employ the term "compensation variations" to note
the interchangeability of sources of happiness. See Adler & Posner, Happiness Research and
Cost Benefit Analysis, in HAPPINESS, at supra note 3, at 253, 264.
58. It is possible that some sources substitute for each other. For example, one's safety
and that of a loved one may be substitute sources of happiness, but no amount of money would
compensate for either one. On the other hand, some sources may be lexically prior to all other
happiness sources.
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extravagant vacation is substitutable for the sense of loss of a loved one.
Finally, in the context of happiness, the bereavement of an individual is
likely to be independent of whether a tort has been committed. If so, the
policy implications would seem to be to compensate all those who lose
a loved one. Of course, this raises the utilitarianism-like issue of
whether the decrease in happiness among those who are taxed to
compensate the bereaved more than offset any decrease in the sense of
bereavement.
Ultimately, and most importantly, the effort of Oswald and
Powdthavee leads to the question of whether happiness is all that counts
as far as public policy. A number of the contributions in Law and
Happiness address this issue. Peter A. Ubel and George Loewenstein,5 9
in their essay "Pain and Suffering Awards: They Should Not Be (Just)
About Pain and Suffering," address the question of how to assess
damages even if people who experience misfortune generally return to
the ex ante level of happiness. First, Ubel and Loewenstein offer an
extended and useful discussion about the validity of claims of hedonic
adaption.6 0 They question, as have others, the validity of the set-point
theory of happiness. Second, they argue that there are "losses" largely
unassociated with one's sense of happiness that should be accounted for
in damage awards. These are things that "matter" but are not figured
into one's happiness. For example, a person who loses certain
capabilities 6 ' may adjust, but it does not alter the fact that the capacity is
eliminated. The loss of the ability to act altruistically may also be a
desired trait that is eliminated but not necessarily related to happiness.
Even from a conventional economic approach, the idea that there are
things other than pleasure to account for makes sense. The fact that a
resource or capability that once was productive is eliminated is a form
of externality that should be internalized by those responsible. This does
not mean, however, that monetary awards can fully offset all types of
losses, nor does it mean the person losing the capability necessarily
receives the award. If, in fact, there is no ultimate decrease in happiness,
there is damage to society but not necessarily damage to the "injured."
In his essay, "Illusory Losses," 62 Cass Sunstein also notes the
limitations of a hedonic adaptation rationale for limiting damages or
viewing losses as only those that are associated with losses in subjective

59. Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Should not be
(Just)About Pain and Suffering, in HAPPINESS, supranote 3, at 195.
60. Id. at 199-202.
61. The capabilities they have in mind are largely those described by Amartya Sen and
Martha Nussbaum. They include having a political voice, access to education, property rights,
and a number of others. See QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
62. Cass Sunstein, Illusory Losses, in HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 157.
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well-being. 63 Like Ubel and Loewenstein, he questions whether hedonic
adaptation is universal.6 4 For example, is it possible that people who
have suffered a great loss actually engage in recalibration, and lower
their expectations or assess their well-being relative to others who have
suffered the same type of loss?65 In addition, he maintains that there
appears to be a difference between losses that are event-oriented and
losses that are persistent.66 Sunstein notes that this is like the difference
between losing toes and being subject to persistent unpleasant noises.67
In effect, some sources of suffering are not subject to hedonic
adaptation because they are continuous. More to point of whether
happiness is all that matters, Sunstein also argues that lost capabilities
should be considered in the award in damages. 68 In short, suppose a
person loses a leg in an accident. 69 It is possible he or she will return to
the ex ante level of happiness. 70 On the other hand, there is a permanent
capability loss. Sunstein's argument here is not based only on the idea
that the loss is in fact an externality that affects productivity. ' It is also
based on empirical evidence indicating that people who claim to have
suffered little or no hedonic loss after misfortune also say that they
would be willing to sacrifice part of their remaining lives to regain the
lost capabilities. This type of data, along with data reported by Ubel
and Loewenstein,7 3 strongly suggest that one can be too casual in
articulating the breadth of the set-point phenomenon.
The somewhat broader theme of refining what happiness should
mean for public policy purposes is taken on by Matthew Adler and Eric
Posner.7 4 Their principle assertion is that policies based on measures of
subjective well-being are not substitutes for, or do not spell the end for
the role of, cost benefit analysis.7 5 This is an important effort drawing

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166-68.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 175-81.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177. Capability analysis seems to have originated with Amartya Sen. See

AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353-69 (1982). The same themes have

been advanced by Martha Nussbaum. For a collection of readings edited by and written by
Professors Sen and Nussbaum, see QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 61.

73. See Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 59, at 199-203.
74. Adler & Posner,HappinessResearch and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in HAPPINESS, supra
note 3, at 253.
75. Id. at 253.
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from the authors' previous work.7 6 In the context of this essay, the
proposal is more along the lines that well-being depends on more than
how one actually feels. Thus, they note the difference between wellbeing and subjective well-being. Much of their thesis is captured by the
statement that "[an] individual's well-being is determined by the
satisfaction of her preferences-more precisely, by the attainment of
those items that well-informed, rational, self-interested individuals
would generally prefer."7 7 They add, "[w]ell-informed, rational
individuals can have self-interested preferences for items other than
their own happiness: for example, health, physical security, status in the
community, or having a family."7 8 They use the phrase "fullinformation preferentialism" to describe their policy standard.79 In
essence, the authors prefer a notion of well-being that is broader than an
individual's own assessment of his or her mental state at any particular
point in time. For example, the well-being of a person would consider
subjective well-being but also health conditions about which the person
may not be aware. Or, a person may enjoy activities like smoking that
are ultimately harmful. Well-being would consider both factors.
Adler and Posner address the question of balancing information and
happiness. For example, a person may find that he has dangerously high
cholesterol levels and then stop eating ice cream, a food from which he
derives great pleasure. He is less happy but probably better off, and may
actually choose a diet that is not as enjoyable. A different example
might involve an employee who, based on her friends in other lines of
employment, is quite happy with her salary. Then she hears for the first
time that people working for her employer and doing the same work are
actually paid more. Happiness turns to unhappiness, not because she is
paid less, but because of what she now knows. The question is whether
she would choose ignorance in order to maintain happiness. It is only
supposition, but it seems likely that she would reject the higher level of
happiness in favor of the highest level of happiness consistent with
being well-informed.
The argument that actual well-being depends on more than how
people feel is a convincing one. The idea that public policy should favor
the standard requires a normative step. To some extent, it is the
normative step involved in the decision not to enter Nozick's experience
machine.8 0 Perhaps the most powerful normative argument would be
76. MATTHEW A. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006).

77. Adler & Posner,Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in HAPPINESS, supra
note 3, at 254.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 260.
80. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2010) (defining the veil of ignorance).
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based on the question of what people would prefer behind something
like the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. 8 ' The question might be posed:
Would you prefer 1) a public policy that means you feel happy all the
time even if it is inconsistent with some measures of objective wellbeing about which you will remain unaware? or 2) a policy that allows
you to experience life with its ups and downs but which advances some
programs that are generally regarded as consistent with objective wellbeing? Again, is it about mental states or some broader notion of wellbeing? 82 In all likelihood, most people would prefer to know what is
actually happening as opposed to what they sense is happening. The
question that remains unanswered is whether this interest in actual facts
is itself a path to subjective happiness. In short, is knowledge of
reality-no matter how dire-a source of happiness that trumps other,
possibly "thinner," notions of happiness?
Ultimately, the goal of Adler and Posner is to defend their view of
cost-benefit analysis against happiness proponents. In the process, they
examine three possibilities. One is that money or income is irrelevant to
well-being-the extreme view.83 Another is that money or income plays
a minor role, and a final one is that subjective well-being is the only
relevant standard.8 4 The second two possibilities are more relevant, but
somewhat awkward, since there is no coherent model that rests entirely
on the basis of subjective well-being. Most of this criticism in both
cases is leveled against utilitarianism-how to measure and how to
compare s-or the existence of hedonic adaptation. In other words, and
going back to the first essay examined in this review, what is a coherent,
valid, and dependable measure of happiness? Perhaps the best to hope
for in this context is that public policy can launder preferences, or at
least their expression, so that people are less likely to make choices that
This "veil" blinds people to all facts about themselves which cloud what
they believe justice is. [N]o one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the
like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of
the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of
justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
81. NozICK, supra note 36, at 42-44.
82. Adler and Posner note that different scholars have developed extensive lists of factors
that are consistent with objective well-being. HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 262-63 tbl.2.
83. Id. at 270-71. The authors devote significant effort to defending their version of costbenefit analysis against the view that money or income plays no role in determining subjective
well-being. Much of this discussion is not so much a defense but a description of how things
would change if it were true that money was unrelated to subjective well-being. Id at 276.
84. Id. at 277, 279.
85. HAPPINESS, supra note 3, at 284-85.
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are ultimately inconsistent with their well-being. 86
In an interesting concluding note, the authors argue that cost-benefit
analysis can be useful even if subjective well-being is the exclusive
end. 7 A simple version of the argument is that cost-benefit analysis can
lead to increases in wealth which mean the possibility of increased
taxation and revenue for the use in subjective well-being increasing
projects.
Ultimately, the skepticism of Alder and Posner seems well founded.
A review of the introductory comments to this Review suggest why.
Moreover, the cost-benefit analysis they envision is superior to an
exclusively subjective self-interest standard. This is, however, a very
low bar, and much of the standard criticisms of conventional economic
models as discussed earlier apply equally to the views of Adler and
Posner.
V. CONCLUSION
Law and Happiness has a Rashamon-like character. Each author
looks at the topic from a different perspective. There is a great deal of
agreement and disagreement. What it provides for the reader is an
overview of the status of this newest addition to the line of "law and
." discussions. A theory of happiness has great appeal because it
seems to bypass the principal problems of standard law and economics.
That is, it does not rely on the process of choice-making to determine
welfare, but examines the results of those choices. Whether the issues
that exist in the application of happiness to law can be satisfactorily
resolved to justify a direct public policy goal of happiness is yet to be
determined. Three tensions are most pressing. How does one
consistently measure happiness with enough precision to guide public
policy? When and to what extent does the set-point phenomenon apply?
Finally, what matters other than subjective well-being? There is little
doubt that many things do matter, but there is disagreement as to what
those factors are or what those factors should be and how to weigh
them-especially when they may reduce subjective well-being.

86. Id. at 281-84.
87. Id. at 288.

